Deepwater Horizon Response by Emergency Personnel
Abstract
This paper addresses the emergency management response to
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. This paper will focus on a critique of the
overall outcome of the responses by assessing the impact of emergency
management. A Summation of the timeline of the response of emergency management
personnel is outlined by referencing two initial responses to this disaster
within 24 hours of the event. Lastly, a logical argument for two alternatives
courses of action will be offered.
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, aka Gulf of Mexico Oil
Spill occurred on April 20, 2010 as the result of an explosion on the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig positioned in the Gulf of Mexico approximately 41 miles off the
coast of Louisiana. The oil rig sank on April 22, 2010 killing eleven people
and injuring 17. Over 8500 U.S. Coast Guard recruits were utilized in reaction
to the spillage, including 9000 service members supplying assistance for
booming and skimming, in-situ burning operations, beach clean-up, sanitization
of equipment, and administrative work. Over 44,000 non-responders and the 9000
USCG members were either on active duty or in the selective service during the
Deepwater Horizon response (Krishnamurthy, et.al, 2019).
As a result of the sinking, a riser ruptured spilling a
discharge of oil into the gulf waters. The size of oil harm estimated to be
1,000 barrels per day, possibly topping at 60,000 barrels per day. Forensic
analysis also proved that blind shear rams had failed due to bent pipes under
pressure due to rising gas and oil (Smithson & Venette, 2013).
Timeline of Responsiveness
It is necessary for response teams to respond quickly and
work fast in teams to clean up spilled oil. BP personnel acted quickly when the
explosion happened and began documenting events as they unfolded. Immediately
following the explosion, Collins (2018) explains a timeline of response:
·
U.S. Air Force Reserve Command deploys
dispersant into the Gulf of Mexico as part of the response effort.
·
U.S. National Response Team begins a
search-and-rescue operation.
·
Wildlife biologists from Georgia’s Department of
Natural Resources descended upon the scene to survey oil sargassum seaweed
immediately after the spill.
·
The State of Louisiana was declared a state of
emergency due to the posing threat as oil neared beaches.
·
Booms-floating devices-were deployed around
islands and gulf waters to contain surface oil.
·
Once the burning oil was contained, skimmers
began sucking oil onto nearby ships. This recovered oil is stored in a bladder
for later disposal.
·
Units used sponges made of oil-absorbing
materials to mop up oil on beaches or on gulf water surfaces.
·
Volunteers and other agency workers used rakes
to scrape from the beaches any oil that washed ashore.
Impact of Emergency Management
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill
resulted in the largest deployment of resources of an environmental agency in
U.S. history. The magnitude of the spill forced Emergency Response Division to
upgrade following subsurface oil, flowrate calculations, and long-term
transportation modeling. The National Office of Response and Restoration
(NOAA), proved instrumental in following and communicating data across many
teams and command posts.
With only twelve full-time responders
and 120 NOAA staff, the scope and complication of the spill stretched the
team’s capacity to respond. NOAA reached out to retired personnel to offer
added emergency support, along with scientists from across the nation and
beyond U.S. borders. Other NOAA programs supplied crucial services on the
ground, on vessels, planes, laboratories, weather stations, and regional
command posts.
As reaction grew, recruiting the
varying missions required exceptional interagency communication. Seven
ships-39% of NOAA fleet-performed missions such as seafood safety monitoring,
oil platform monitoring, and uncovering subsurface oil. Five NOAA aircraft flew
over 773 hours to pursue the oil spill and to gauge air quality impacts. Staff
worked 24/7 displaying where oil might spread to help calm public concern
(NOAA, 2017).
The Unified Area Command engaged
more than 835 oil skimmers, 9700 boats, 120 planes, and over 10,000 containers
of prospect to locate and eradicate oil. The Unified Area Command established
tactical and operative aims aligned with National Incident Command strategies
and operated precisely with other federal, state, and local officials to
utilize crucial resources to the affected (Millican, 2011).
Alternative Courses of Action
Being prepared for a major catastrophe such as that of
Deepwater Horizon is not a one-time effort. With such a wide-scale impact on
the natural environment, this incident might not have been avoidable, but
lessons can be learned from a disaster of this magnitude. First, drilling offshore,
especially in deep water is risky and dangerous in and of itself. One
recommendation is to implement regulations created to guarantee that the
strategic approach integrates protection against risks connected with drilling
and achievement developments.
Another alternative course of action is for the U.S. to
implement Canada’s Same Season Relief Well Capability prerequisite. Basically,
a potential oil company must show that its structure is viable and can be
installed to drill a relief well in the same season. Rightly so, it may be
necessary to necessitate that a relief well be drilled at the same time as the
initial well. This is a costly option; however, it is inexpensive compared to
the billions BP and other companies will spend to contain clean up methods on
any future spills. Imposing penalties and fines against these companies will
help deter future accidents.
Conclusion
Response time is critical in emergency situations. Reaction
time depends on quick thinking and timing. Significant reaction time allowed
responders to effectively contain the explosion and contain oil spillage of the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig. Without the efforts of air, ship, and ground
personnel, working as a unified team, the damage could have been more
extensive. Response teams were vital in utilizing science in real-time to
assess damage, implement plans and strategies, and contain damage to the
environment and surrounding species.
References
Collins, T. (2018). Gulf oil spill. Smithsonian.
Retrieved from https://ocean.si.edu/conservation/pollution/gulf-oil-spill.
Millican, J.
(2011). Deepwater Horizon response 2010. Armed Forces Comptroller. 56(2)
p. 28-36. Retrieved from http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=40e679ef-0dae-408e-a6ef-058d0e234dc6%40pdc-v-sessmgr03
NOAA. (2017).
Deepwater Horizon: Response in the midst of an historic crisis. National
Office of Response and Restoration. Retrieved from https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/deepwater-horizon-response-midst-historic-crisis.html
Smithson,
J., Venette, S. (2013). Stonewalling as an image defense strategy: A critical
examination of BP's response to the Deepwater Horizon explosion. Communication
Studies. 64(4). p. 395-410 Retrieved from http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&sid=02f1f3b5-64ee-45eb-b7ff-23b136f442a1%40sessionmgr102
.
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